This paper studies bidder collusion with communication in repeated auctions when no side transfer is possible. It presents a simple dynamic bid rotation scheme with co-ordinates bids based on communication history and enables intertemporal transfer of bidders' payoffs. The paper derives a sufficient condition for such a dynamic scheme to be an equilibrium and characterises the equilibrium payoffs in a general environment with affiliated signals and private or interdependent values. With IPV, it is shown that this dynamic scheme yields a strictly higher payoff to the bidders than any static collusion scheme which co-ordinates bids based only on the current reported signals.
Introduction
It is well recognized that bidder collusion is a serious problem in many auctions: Collusion is documented in auctions for used machinery, timbers, frequency spectrums, Treasury securities, the procurement of construction work, etc. Marshall and Meurer 1995 , Porter and Zona 1990 , Baldwin et al. 1997 . Despite its signi cance as an empirical phenomenon, relatively little is understood about the theory of collusion in auctions, which is distinguished from the standard collusion theory by the presence of asymmetric information across bidders about their valuations of the object.
Most of the existing analysis of collusion in auctions is conducted in the one-shot framework. One important contribution in this case is made by McAfee and McMillan 1992 , who analyze bidder collusion with communication in rst-price auctions under the independent private values IPV assumption. Their key ndings include the identi cation of the most e cient collusion schemes with and without side transfer. In particular, they show that full collusion is possible with side transfer, but that the scope of bidder collusion is severely limited without it.
If collusion is a product of frequent i n teraction, however, a more appropriate framework for analysis is that of repeated games, where the same set of bidders participate in a series of auctions held sequentially over time. 1 The purpose of this paper is to show that in in nitely repeated auctions, collusion is possible through intertemporal payo transfer even if there is no side payment of money. In other words, bidders in repeated auctions can collude through the adjustment of continuation payo s in a way that partially compensates for the lack o f monetary transfer. The paper derives a su cient condition for such a collusion scheme to be an equilibrium and characterizes the equilibrium payo s in a general environment with a liated signals and private or interdependent v alues.
We consider a model of in nitely repeated auctions with two symmetric bidders. In every period, a single indivisible object is sold through the same auction format, and the bidders' private signals are drawn from the same distribution.
The bidders collude by coordinating their bids in each auction with the help of a media-tion device referred to here as a center. In each period, the center receives reports from the bidders about their private signals and then instructs them on what bid to submit in the stage auction. This stage mechanism, which c hooses instructions as a function of reports, is called an instruction rule in this paper. A collusion scheme represents the center's choice of an instruction rule in every period contingent on history. A collusion scheme is an equilibrium if truth-telling is incentive compatible and obedience to the instructions is rational for the bidders. This paper examines a bid rotation scheme which instructs no more than one bidder to participate in each stage auction during the collusion phase, and punishes any deviation from the instruction by reversion to the one-shot Nash equilibrium of the stage auction. In particular, we will construct a bid rotation scheme which uses three di erent instruction rules during the collusion phase as follows: In the original symmetric phase S, the center uses the e cient instruction rule which instructs the bidder with the higher valuation based on the reports to bid the reservation price R if and only if his valuation exceeds R. It instructs the other bidder to stay out. In phase A i i = 1, 2, the center uses an asymmetric instruction rule which disfavors bidder i in the sense that i's ex ante payo is lower than that of bidder j.
It can be seen that the e cient instruction rule used in phase S is not incentive compatible since the bidders tend to overstate their signals in the hope of winning the object at the reservation price. We suppose that the incentive for truth-telling in phase S is provided through the adjustment in continuation payo s as follows: When bidder i's reported signal is higher than that of j, a transition to phase A i takes place with positive probability s o that bidder i's continuation payo would be lower. The instruction rule used in phase A i is chosen to be incentive compatible so that no further adjustment in continuation payo s is necessary. Phase A i lasts for a xed number of periods, and the game returns to phase S.
The above discussion suggests that the bid rotation scheme considered in this paper is a dynamic scheme which c hooses a di erent instruction rule contingent on the communication history. On the other hand, the one-shot collusion scheme analyzed by McAfee and McMillan 1992 corresponds to a static bid rotation scheme in repeated auctions which uses the same instruction rule every period. Note in particular that any instruction rule used by a static 4 collusion scheme must be incentive compatible since no adjustment in continuation payo s is possible. The advantage of dynamic bid rotation is most evident in the IPV environment. Speci cally, when the auction is rst-price, it can be shown that the dynamic scheme is an equilibrium for su ciently patient bidders and yields a strictly higher payo to them than the optimal static scheme without side transfer. The intuition is as follows: The optimal static scheme of McAfee and McMillan 1992 uses a random instruction rule whose support consists of the two asymmetric instruction rules used in phases A 1 and A 2 of the dynamic scheme described above. It follows that the average of a bidder's payo s in these two phases exactly equals his payo from the optimal static scheme. Since the allocation in phase S is e cient, the bidder's overall payo in the repeated game is strictly higher. It should be noted that the collusion scheme described above does not extract all the surplus of the trade from the auctioneer. In other words, the scheme is not rst-best e cient from the point of view of the bidders. The question of rst-best e ciency in collusion without side transfer under asymmetric information is indeed very di cult. E ciency results are available only in IPV models with nite signals: Fudenberg et al. 1994 show that the IPV model with nite signals and communication has the product structure," which guarantees the existence of a near e cient equilibrium for su ciently low discounting. 2 As is often the case with mechanism design problems, however, conclusions based on nite signals do not necessarily extend to continuous signals. 3 As mentioned above, most existing models of collusion in auctions are one-shot. Robinson 1985 and von Ungern-Sternberg 1988 are among the rst to point out the vulnerability o f the English and second-price sealed-bid auctions to bidder collusion. 4 Marshall 1987 and Graham et al. 1990 While the intuition behind their results is closely related to ours, their formal logic is specialized to the particular auction format as well as the IPV assumption. In contrast, one of this paper's main objectives is to present a simple collusion scheme which is robust with respect to these speci cations.
In this paper, it is assumed that every stage auction has the same format. While we b elieve that it is an appropriate description of many actual practices, an alternative formulation would include the auctioneer as an active player of the game. In the one-shot framework, Mailath and Zemsky 1991 and McAfee and McMillan 1992 both discuss the choice of the reservation price as the auctioneer's response to collusion. In repeated auctions, the corresponding treatment is to let the auctioneer choose the reservation price as a function of history. The analysis of such a model is left as a topic of future research.
The organization of the paper is as follows: The next section formulates a model of repeated auctions with the center as a mediation device. The dynamic bid rotation scheme is described in Section 3. The main theorem in this section gives a su cient condition for this scheme to be an equilibrium and describes the equation that characterizes its payo . Section 4 provides a comparison of the dynamic and static schemes under the IPV assumption. Section 5 discusses the generalization of the su cient condition for the existence of an equilibrium dynamic bid rotation scheme that yields a strictly higher payo than the optimal static scheme.
Model
There are two risk-neutral bidders 1 and 2 and a center which coordinates their bidding 5 An earlier version of this paper contains an extension of this result. 6 I became aware of these papers after the rst version of the present paper was completed. 6 in in nitely repeated auctions. A single indivisible object is sold every period through a xed auction format. In each period, bidder i receives a private signal s i 2 0; 1 about the value of the object. The probability distribution of the signal pro le s = s 1 ; s 2 is the same in every period and represented by the density function f whose support is the unit square 0;1 2 . The signals are independent across periods. The conditional density o f s i given s j is denoted f i j s j , and the corresponding distribution function is denoted F i j s j i 6 = j .
With slight abuse of notation, we also use f i resp. F i to denote the marginal density resp. distribution of s i i = 1, 2. We assume that Given the signal pro le s = s 1 ; s 2 , the expected value of the object to bidder i is denoted v i s 0. Throughout, we adopt the convention that the rst argument o f v i is s i own signal and the second is s j the other bidder's signal. The value function v i is the same for every period.
Throughout, the problem is assumed to be symmetric in the sense that f ; = f ; and v i ; = v j ; for every , 2 0; 1 .
The following two possibilities will be considered concerning the functional form of v i . The values are private if v i s = s i for every s = s i ; s j , and interdependent if v i is strictly increasing in both s i and s j i = 1 , 2 , j 6 = i . In the case of interdependent v alues, the function v i is assumed to satisfy the following regularity conditions. Clearly, 2 g gives the rst-best joint collusive p a y o , and the bidders see a potential gain from collusion if g 0 g . This is the case to be studied in what follows. 7 The restriction to a seal-bid auction is purely for simplicity. 8
Collusion in the repeated auction takes the following form: At the beginning of each period, the two bidders report their private signals s i to the center. Upon receiving the report pro leŝ = s 1 ; s 2 2 0; 1 2 , the center chooses instruction to each bidder i on what generalized bid to submit in the stage auction.
In general, the bidders may report a false signal, and or disobey the instruction. Bidder i's reporting rule i : 0 ; 1 ! 0;1 chooses reportŝ i as a function of signal s i , and his bidding rule i : 0 ; 1 2 B ! B chooses bid b i in the stage action as a function of his signal, report and instruction. The reporting rule is honest if it always reports the true signal, and the bidding rule is obedient if it always obeys the instruction. Denote by i and i bidder i's honest reporting rule and obedient action rule, respectively. For simplicity, w e assume that the generalized bids in the stage auction are observable to every party including the center. 8 It should be noted that the conclusion of this paper continues to hold in an alternative framework where only the identity of the winner is publicly observable. This is because i the designated winner in each stage auction obtains the object at the lowest price possible = reservation price in the collusion scheme considered in this paper, and ii the designated loser may gain from disobeying the instruction only by c hanging the identity of the winner. The observability of bids implies that a bidder's deviation can be classi ed into two t ypes: A bidder commits an observable deviation when he chooses a bid di erent from the instruction given to him, and commits an unobservable deviation when he reports a false signal.
The center is formally a communication device as de ned by F orges 1986 and Myerson 1986. Its choice of instructions to the bidders given their reports is captured by a n instruction rule q = q 1 ; q 2 : 0 ; 1 2 ! B 2 : q i ŝ is the instruction to bidder i when the report pro le isŝ. Let g i ; ;q denote bidder i's stage payo resulting from any pro le ; ;q o f reporting and bidding rules ; = 1 ; 1 ; 2 ; 2 and instruction rule q. The instruction rule q is one-shot incentive compatible one-shot IC if neither bidder has an incentive t o misreport his signal: g i ; ; q g i i ; j ; ; q for any reporting rule i , i = 1, 2, and j 6 = i. Note that one-shot incentive compatibility refers only to the incentive in reporting 8 If the center is a simple communication device which does not have a n y observation function of its own, we can let the bidders report each other's bid to the center so that its instructions in the next period will be conditional on the reports. 9
and presumes bidders' obedience to the given instructions. In particular, the instruction rule that instructs bidders to play the one-shot Nash equilibrium of the stage auction is one-shot IC. Lemma 1 in the next section identi es some other instruction rules with this property. Bidder i's communication history in period t in the repeated auction game is the sequence of his reports and instructions in periods 1; : : : ; t,1. On the other hand, bidder i's private history in period t is the sequence of his private signals s i in periods 1; : : : ; t , 1. Furthermore, the public history in period t is a sequence of instruction rules used by the center in periods 1; : : : ; tand generalized bid pro les in the stage auctions in periods 1; : : : ; t,1.
Bidder i's pure strategy i in the repeated auction chooses the pair i ; i of reporting and bidding rules in each period t as a function of his communication and private histories in t, and the public history in t. Let i be bidder i's honest and obedient strategy which plays the pair i ; i of the honest reporting rule and obedient bidding rule for all histories.
The collusion scheme describes the center's choice of an instruction rule in every period as a function of communication and public histories. At the beginning of each period, it publicly informs the bidders which instruction rule is used in that period.
Our analysis will focus on the following class of grim-trigger" collusion schemes with two phases: The game starts in the collusion phase, and reverts to the punishment phase forever if and only if there is an observable deviation by either bidder in the sense described above. In the punishment phase, the bidders are instructed to play the one-shot Nash equilibrium of the stage auction speci ed in Assumption 3iv.
A collusion scheme in this class is static if it chooses the same instruction rule in every period during the collusion phase independent of the history, and is dynamic otherwise. Furthermore, the collusion scheme employs bid rotation if no more than one bidder is instructed to participate in each stage auction during the collusion phase. Let 1 be the bidders' common discount factor, and i ; be bidder i's average discounted payo normalized by 1 , in the repeated game under the strategy pro le ; . The collusion scheme is an equilibrium if the pair = 1 ; 2 of honest and obedient strategies constitutes a Nash equilibrium of the repeated game: i ; i 0 i ; j ; for any 0 i , i = 1 ; 2, and j 6 = i. It follows from the de nition that if is an equilibrium static collusion scheme, then its instruction rule in the collusion phase is one-shot IC. 10
A Dynamic Bid Rotation Scheme
Let q be the e cient instruction rule that instructs bidder i to bid R if his valuation v i ŝ based on the report pro leŝ is higher than both R and v j ŝ, and to stay out otherwise: q i ŝ = R if v i ŝ maxfR; v j ŝg, N otherwise. Clearly, the ex ante payo g i ; ; q associated with q equals the rst-best level g although q is not one-shot IC.
Consider next the asymmetric instruction rule q i that i instructs bidder j 6 = i t o b i d R if his valuation v j ŝ exceeds R, and to stay out otherwise, and ii instructs bidder i to bid R if his valuation v i ŝ exceeds R and if bidder j's valuation v j would not exceed R even when i's signal were 1:
Notherwise.
In other words, q i treats bidders j and i as the primary and secondary bidders, respectively. Let g = g i ; ; q i and g = g j ; ; q i be the bidders' expected payo s under q i . By de nition, g g . Lemma 1. q i is one-shot IC.
Proof: See the Appendix. Since 2g is the rst-best joint collusive p a y o , it can be readily veri ed that 2 2g g + g;
where the strict inequality is the consequence of the full support of the density function f and R v i 1;1. Let d be a dynamic bid rotation scheme such that:
a The collusion phase consists of three subphases S, A 1 and A 2 : S is the original symmetric phase where the e cient instruction rule q is used, while A i is the asymmetric phase where the instruction rule q i is used.
b Play begins in the symmetric phase S. After each period in phase S, transition to the asymmetric phase A i i = 1, 2 takes place with probability ! i ŝ, which is a function of the 11
reported signals in the current period alone and given by ! i ŝ = x s i ifŝ i ŝ j , 0 otherwise, for some increasing function x : 0 ; 1 ! 0;1 . Play stays in phase S with probability 1 , ! 1 ŝ , ! 2 ŝ.
c Each asymmetric phase A i lasts exactly for m periods and then play returns to S.
It should be noted that the transition probability xŝ i depends only on the higher of the two reports. There is a clear connection between the above collusion scheme and the one with side transfer in McAfee and McMillan 1992. In McAfee and McMillan 1992 , each bidder is discouraged from overstating his signal by the transfer payment that is required from the bidder with the higher report. On the other hand, the deterrent in the above s c heme is the possibility o f a l o w er continuation payo for such a bidder. This is a natural modi cation of the side transfer scheme in view of the substitutability of continuation payo s for monetary transfer in repeated games. 'u u , g + 2u , g , g u , g yu = 0 : Note that the function ' : g ; 1 ! R is continuous since y is. The following is our main theorem.Theorem 1. Assume that the values are either private or interdependent. If 'u = 0 has a solution u d strictly greater than g 0 , then for a su ciently large discount factor , the dynamic bid rotation scheme d is an equilibrium for some x transition probability and m duration of phase A i , and yields payo u d .
Proof: See the Apendix.
It should be noted that low discounting is required for d to be an equilibrium although 3 and its solution u d are independent o f . While 'u = 0 is not analytically solvable in general, there is a simple su cient condition based on the comparison of g 0 and g + g=2 a s follows: Since yu 0 for any u g , it readily follows from 2 that 'g = 2 g , g , g g , g y g 0and ' g + g 2 = g + g 2 , g 0: By the intermediate value theorem, hence, there exists u d 2 , g + g=2; g that solves 'u = 0. The intuition behind u d g + g=2 is as follows: Phases A 1 and A 2 are equally likely ex ante so that a bidder's expected payo conditional on being in these two phases equals g + g = 2. Since allocation is e cient in phase S, his overall payo in the repeated game exceeds it. This observation combined with Theorem 1 yields the following corollary. 
Dynamic vs. Static Collusion Schemes with IPV
In this section, we apply Theorem 1 to the IPV environment where the signals are independent and the values are private. Theorem 2 below states that the condition of Theorem 1 holds when the stage auction is either rst-price or second-price.
Theorem 2. Assume independent private values IPV. Suppose that the stage auction is either rst-price or second-price sealed-bid. Then for a su ciently large discount factor , the dynamic bid rotation scheme d is an equilibrium for some x and m, and its payo u d is strictly higher than both g + g=2 and g 0 .
Based on the conclusion of Theorem 2, we n o w turn to the comparison of the collusive p a y o s associated with static and dynamic collusion schemes under IPV. In rst-price sealed-bid auctions with IPV, McAfee and McMillan 1992 show that a certain degree of collusion is possible in some cases even if there is no side transfer and the auction is oneshot. Their theorem directly applies to the current repeated game framework and yields the characterization of the most e cient equilibrium static collusion scheme. Let h i s i = 1 , F i s i f i s i be the inverse hazard rate of s i . The following theorem is stated without a proof as it is a straightforward application of Theorem 1 of McAfee and McMillan 1992. Theorem 3. Assume independent private values IPV. Suppose that the stage auction is rst-price sealed-bid. Let s be the most e cient equilibrium static collusion scheme without 14 side transfer for a su ciently large discount factor . Then s is a grim-trigger scheme, and its payo u s is as follows: i If h i is weakly increasing, then u s equals the one-shot equilibrium payo g 0 .
ii If h i is weakly decreasing, then u s equals g + g=2.
Note that the static collusion scheme must use a one-shot IC instruction rule in every period since no incentive for truthful reporting can be provided through the adjustment i n continuation payo s. In particular, McAfee and McMillan 1992 show that when h i i s decreasing case ii above, the e cient static scheme s uses a random instruction rulẽ q : 0 ; 1 2 ! B 2 which places probability one-half each o n q i and q j de ned in the previous section:q = 1 2 q i + 1 2 q j . More explicitly, q can be written as q i ŝ;q j ŝ = In other words, the participating bidder is chosen at random with probability one-half when both valuations exceed R. Clearly, such an instruction rule is one-shot IC.
Comparison of Theorems 2 and 3 immediately reveals that when h i is monotone, the dynamic bid rotation scheme d outperforms any static bid rotation scheme. The following corollary summarizes this observation.
Corollary 2 . Assume independent private values IPV. Suppose that the stage auction is rst-price sealed-bid, and that h i is monotone. Then for a su ciently large discount factor , the dynamic bid rotation scheme d is an equilibrium for some x and m, and yields a strictly higher payo than any equilibrium static bid rotation scheme.
Example 2: Suppose that the stage-auction is rst-price, and that s i has the uniform distribution over 0;1 . Assume that is su ciently large. 9 Since h 0 i s i 0 for every s i , the best static scheme yields u s = g + g = 2 b y Theorem 3. Table 1 5. Su cient Condition
In this section, we reformulate the su cient condition for the existence of an equilibrium dynamic collusion scheme that achieves a strictly higher payo than the optimal static scheme. Speci cally, this condition is expressed in terms of the payo vectors associated with asymmetric one-shot IC instruction rules.
Corollary 1 shows that the payo from the dynamic scheme d is strictly higher than the average of the payo s associated with two asymmetric instruction rules q 1 and q 2 used in phases A 1 and A 2 , respectively. By the same logic, if we construct a dynamic bid rotation scheme using any other pair of asymmetric one-shot IC instuction rules, then a bidder's payo in that scheme is strictly higher than the average of his payo s from these two instruction rules. Formally, de ne V to be the set of payo vectors associated with one-shot IC instruction rules: V = g 1 ; ; q ; g 2 ; ; q : q is a one-shot IC instruction rule :
By the standard argument, the set V is closed. Note also that the one-shot Nash equilibrium payo vector g 0 ; g 0 belongs to V . Let u s = i ; s be the payo associated with the most e cient symmetric static collusion scheme s . Since s uses a one-shot IC instruction rule as previously noted, it follows that u s ; u s 2V. Graphically, u s ; u s is the right-most point of the intersection between V and the 45 degree line through the origin. 16
Theorem 4. Assume that the values are either private or interdependent. Suppose that the payo vector u s ; u s associated with the most e cient symmetric static collusion scheme is not an extreme point of the set V . Then for a su ciently large discount factor , there exists an equilibrium dynamic bid rotation scheme d whose payo u d is strictly higher than u s .
Proof: Since u s ; u s is not an extreme point, symmetry implies that there exist one-shot IC instruction rulesq 1 andq 2 with the payo vectors g 0 ; g 0 2 V and g 0 ; g 0 2V, respectively, for some g 0 and g 0 such that g 0 g 0 and g 0 + g 0 = 2 u s . W e also have 2 g g 0 + g 0 b y the same logic as in 2. Modify d in Section 3 so that it choosesq i in subphase A i i = 1 , 2. By Corollary 1, d is an equilibrium for su ciently patient bidders and its payo u d is strictly higher than g 0 + g 0 =2 u s .
F or example, suppose that the stage-auction is rst-price. Suppose further that IPV holds and and that h i is decreasing. In this case, we know from Corollary 2 that the payo vector u d ; u d associated with the dynamic bid rotation scheme d strictly dominates u s ; u s . In the light of Theorem 4, this is precisely because u s ; u s is not an extreme point of V : In fact, it equals the convex combination of g;g and g; g 2 V Theorem 2.
To see that the condition of Theorem 4 is su cient but not necessary, consider the rstprice IPV auctions with an increasing h i . In this case, u s ; u s equals the one-shot Nash equilibrium payo vector g 0 ; g 0 Theorem 3 and u d ; u d dominates g 0 ; g 0 regardless of whether it is an extreme point o f V or not Theorem 2. 
